Three senior Ghanaian statespersons— Prof. Kwabena Frimpong-Boateng, Dr. Nyaho Nyaho-Tamakloe, and Dr. Christine Amoako-Nuamah— represented by their counsel, Oliver Barker-Vormawor, have filed a constitutional suit at the Supreme Court, challenging the delegate-based internal electoral systems used by the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the National Democratic Congress (NDC), and the Convention People’s Party (CPP).
In their suit, they have also joined the Electoral Commission (EC) and the Attorney-General as defendants, arguing that limiting flagbearer and parliamentary candidate selection to a small electoral college disenfranchises ordinary party members and violates constitutional democratic principles.
Their legal team is seeking declarations that the systems and specific party constitutional provisions are unconstitutional and seeking orders to compel more inclusive, universal member participation in internal party elections.
I agree with them. And here is why:
Ghana’s Constitutional Democracy
The 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana establishes Ghana as a sovereign democratic state founded on the rule of law, respect for fundamental human rights, and popular participation.
Article 1(1) provides:
“The sovereignty of Ghana resides in the people of Ghana in whose name and for whose welfare the powers of government are to be exercised.”
This is not just symbolic language. It establishes popular sovereignty as the foundation of governance. Political power flows from the people, not from elites, not from institutions, and certainly not from small internal party electoral colleges.
Ghana operates a constitutional, multi-party democracy. Article 55 expressly guarantees the right to form political parties and participate in political activity, subject to the Constitution. Political parties are, therefore, not private clubs in the ordinary sense; they are constitutional actors within the democratic architecture. They are the vehicles through which citizens exercise sovereignty.
The Democratic Character of the Ghanaian State
- Ghana’s system is a representative democracy. Citizens do not govern directly; they elect representatives— Members of Parliament and a President, who exercise authority on their behalf.
However, representation is meaningful only when the processes leading to candidature are democratic.
In many constituencies in Ghana, particularly so-called “safe seats”, the internal party primary is effectively the decisive election. The candidate selected by the party is almost certain to win the parliamentary seat.
If the real contest happens inside the party, then internal party democracy becomes constitutionally significant.
A system where 400 to 1,200 delegates choose a parliamentary candidate, while thousands of registered party members are excluded, raises a serious democratic tension.
If sovereignty resides in the people, then internal structures that narrow decision-making to a few undermine the spirit of the Constitution.
The Constitutional Duties of Citizens
Article 41 of the Constitution outlines the fundamental duties owed by every citizen to the Republic.
It requires citizens to uphold and defend the Constitution, to participate actively in the life of the community, and to protect and preserve public property.
It further imposes a duty to combat corruption and the abuse of power, and to contribute meaningfully to the well-being of society. These obligations reflect the Constitution’s vision of citizenship not merely as a status, but as an active and continuing responsibility within the democratic order.
Political participation is not merely a right; it is a constitutional duty. When citizens join political parties, register as party members, and commit to a political organisation, they are fulfilling their civic obligation to participate in governance.
Denying them the opportunity to vote in internal elections restricts their ability to fully discharge that constitutional duty. In this case, the democratic ethos requires full participation without structurally limiting it.
Political Parties as Constitutional Gatekeepers
Although political parties are, in form, voluntary associations, their role in Ghana’s constitutional order extends far beyond private organisation.
They perform a distinct public function at the heart of democratic governance: they nominate presidential candidates who may ultimately assume executive authority, select parliamentary candidates who shape the composition of the legislature, develop national policy platforms that frame public debate, and significantly influence legislative outcomes once in office.
In substance, therefore, political parties operate not merely as private clubs, but as constitutional gatekeepers whose internal processes carry profound public consequences.
In practical terms, no citizen can realistically contest for elections without going through a political party structure. Winning as an independent candidate is quite rare, considering the data. Therefore, internal party processes have direct implications for national governance.
When internal party elections are restricted to small delegate systems, power inevitably concentrates in the hands of a narrow circle of party insiders. In such environments, campaigns tend to shift from broad-based persuasion to transactional engagement, where influence over a limited voting bloc becomes the primary objective.
The economics of competition can also distort incentives, making vote buying appear financially rational when the electorate is small and identifiable. Over time, accountability flows upward toward those who control delegate access rather than downward to the wider party membership, weakening internal democracy and diluting the representative character of political leadership.
Expanding internal voting rights to all registered party members in a constituency restores the democratic chain back to the grassroots.
Reducing Corruption Through Structural Reform
The delegate system, by design, creates a small and clearly identifiable electoral college. Such a structure produces predictable consequences.
Where the voting population is limited and known, financial inducements can be precisely targeted and, from a purely strategic standpoint, more manageable.
The concentration of decision-making power also lowers the threshold for factional capture, as influence over a relatively small group can determine outcomes. In this environment, wealth assumes disproportionate significance, often becoming a decisive factor in internal contests and distorting the broader democratic intent of party participation.
By contrast, a universal internal voting model where every registered party member in the constituency votes significantly raises the cost of corruption and reduces its effectiveness.
You cannot easily monetise a constituency-wide electorate. If Article 41 calls on citizens to combat corruption and abuse of power, then political parties must structure their systems in ways that do not incentivise it.
Reform is, therefore, not merely political; it is ethical and constitutional.
Strengthening Legitimacy and Stability
Internal party disputes frequently spill beyond internal mechanisms, often resulting in litigation, independent candidacies, voter apathy, and, in some instances, subtle forms of electoral sabotage.
These outcomes weaken party cohesion and erode public confidence in the political process. By contrast, when thousands of party members participate directly in selecting a candidate, the legitimacy of the outcome is significantly strengthened.
Even factions that do not prevail are more inclined to accept the result because the mandate reflects broad-based participation rather than negotiation among a limited circle of insiders.
A candidate elected by 15,000 party members carries far greater moral and political authority than one chosen by 500 delegates. Such legitimacy enhances party unity, reduces post-primary fragmentation, and ultimately strengthens parliamentary representation.
Addressing Concerns Raised on the Registered Members Approach
Several concerns are commonly raised against expanding internal party primaries to all registered members.
First, there are cost implications: broadening participation would inevitably increase logistical and administrative expenses, particularly in organising voting across multiple constituencies.
Second, infiltration risks are cited, with opponents warning that rival party supporters could strategically register to influence outcomes.
Third, logistical complexity is viewed as a serious obstacle, as managing nationwide internal elections is perceived to be administratively demanding and potentially disorderly.
Fourth, verification challenges arise, especially regarding how to authenticate legitimate party membership at scale.
Fifth, some argue that widening participation could intensify factional tensions rather than promote unity.
Finally, delegate systems are defended on the basis that they are structured and controllable, preserving hierarchy, discipline, and organisational stability within the party.
While these concerns are not frivolous, they are manageable within a modern democratic framework.
Cost Concerns
Democratic expansion does require investment. However, Ghana successfully conducts nationwide general elections across 275 constituencies. Political parties already operate within this territorial structure. The administrative template exists. The question is not feasibility but prioritisation. The long-term cost of exclusion litigation, party fragmentation, defections, voter apathy, and electoral sabotage often exceeds the financial cost of inclusion.
Infiltration Risks
Infiltration is a legitimate concern in any expanded internal voting system, but it is neither novel nor unmanageable. It can be effectively addressed through practical safeguards such as digitised and regularly audited membership registers, clearly enforced cut-off dates for new registrations prior to primaries, structured membership vetting at the constituency level, and the imposition of a mandatory minimum duration of membership before voting eligibility.
These mechanisms are widely used in party systems across established democracies and demonstrate that the risk of strategic infiltration, while real, is controllable through disciplined administrative design.
Logistical Challenges
Parties already maintain constituency, polling station, and branch structures for mobilisation during general elections. Leveraging these existing structures reduces the complexity of internal primaries. With digital coordination and clear rules, nationwide internal voting is administratively feasible.
Verification Mechanisms
Biometric verification, QR-coded membership cards, and integrated digital databases can be implemented at party level. Technology has reduced the administrative burden that once justified small-delegate colleges.
Factional Stability
- Contrary to fears, broader participation often deepens legitimacy. When thousands participate, losing factions are more likely to accept results because the mandate reflects broad participation rather than insider negotiation.
Organisational Control vs Democratic Legitimacy
Delegate systems concentrate influence and are easier to manage but ease of control is not the same as democratic integrity. Political parties perform a constitutional public function.
The internal method of candidate selection shapes national governance outcomes. Systems that disproportionately empower small electoral colleges invite transactional politics and undermine moral authority.
Democratic expansion is not about convenience. It is about alignment with the constitutional spirit.
If sovereignty ultimately resides in the people, if citizens bear a constitutional duty to participate in governance, and if political parties function as instruments of representation within the constitutional framework, then, it follows that internal party elections should embody broad-based participation.
Processes that determine who may contest national office cannot be insulated from the democratic principles that legitimise the State itself. Internal party democracy must, therefore, reflect the wider constitutional commitment to inclusivity, participation, and accountability to the people.
Administrative difficulty is not a constitutional defence for democratic restriction. Investment in internal democracy strengthens legitimacy, reduces post-primary instability, and enhances public trust. In contrast, maintaining narrow electoral colleges may preserve short-term control but risks long-term erosion of credibility.
Conclusion
Ghana’s democracy has matured considerably since 1992. The country has experienced a peaceful alternation of political power, a strengthening of judicial review, and a steady rise in civic consciousness and engagement.
These gains reflect institutional growth and constitutional resilience. Yet the next meaningful stage of democratic evolution must take place within political parties themselves. If sovereignty ultimately resides in the people, if citizens bear a constitutional duty to participate in governance, and if political parties serve as instruments of representation within the constitutional framework, then, internal party processes must mirror those foundational principles.
Elections confined to small-delegate colleges sit uneasily with the spirit of constitutional democracy, which is anchored in broad-based participation, inclusivity, and accountability to the wider citizenry rather than to narrow electoral elite.
Ghana cannot be a full democracy at the national level and a restricted oligarchy at the party level. To deepen constitutional governance, reduce corruption, empower citizens, and strengthen legitimacy, all political parties in Ghana should allow every registered party member within a constituency to vote in internal party elections.
Democracy is not merely about elections every four years. It is about how power is structured at every level. And if sovereignty truly resides in the people, then the people, not a few, must decide.
The writer, Lom Nuku Ahlijah, is a lawyer, an author and a law lecturer at the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA).
Source: Media Without Borders/mwbonline.org/Ghana/West Africa
